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Introduction
George Washington's sentiments on the obligations of citizens
were clear. He regarded military service as the duty of every male
citizen who enjoyed the privileges of democracy.

He stressed that

an army composed of citizen-soldiers was preferable, from a point
of social cohesion and political stability, to one composed of
professional soldiers - and cited the swiss Army as the proper
example (Graham, 1971).
In spite of these perceived benefits, the United States has
historically been of two minds with respect to providing for the
national defense.

That is, should the military be composed of

professional soldiers,

induced to enlist by opportunity cost

differentials or a taste for military service?

Or should the

military consist in large part of citizen-soldiers responding to a
national obligation - in much the same manner as citizens called
for jury duty (Lacey, 1982)?

The national response to security

threats has reflected this dichotomy.

From the Civil War to World

War II, the government periodically relied on conscription to
augment a small, professional army.
II,

the

In the aftermath of World war

draft apparatus was dismantled,

reconstructed with the onset of the Cold War.

only

to be quickly

For the next twenty

five years conscription (and draft-induced enlistments) provided a
substantial portion of our armed forces; spreading the military
experience over a large segment of the young, male population.
Given the necessity for maintaining a large military presence over
an protracted period,

the draft came to be viewed as a reasonable
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demand of citizenship.

It remained for an unpopular war and a

unfairly selective draft to dim the values of a broader military
experience.
Gates Commission
In 1970, the Gates Commission was convened by President Nixon
to consider the abolition of an increasingly unpopular draft.

The

Gates Commission found the draft to be arbitrary and discriminatory
in its burden; a "tax" neither universally borne, nor one with an
equal probability of being borne by different segments of the
population (Report. 1970). The draft was viewed as inequitable and
an all volunteer service (AVS) as preferable, particularly from the
perspective of applied economic theory.

Thus, for the past twenty

years, the US military has been an all-volunteer service
The issue is not whether to reinstate conscription; for all
purposes the draft is extinct.

The issue at hand is whether

society is better when a smaller percentage of its membership
experiences military training.

Did the staff economists who had

substantial input into the final Gates Report err in their cost
benefit analysis?

Specifically,

were the social benefits of

military service understated in the cost-benefit analysis?

The

paper proposes that they indeed were.
Much of the economic argument which supported the abolition of
conscription cited the "tax" of the draft; broadly defined as
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coercion, evasion, and collection costs, a military wage less than
the reservation wage, and lower lifetime earnings.

Furthermore,

opponents of the draft noted that the draft tax was arbitrary,
regressive, and shouldered disproportionately by minorities. Today,
in the absence of a draft and the presence of a pay scale which
more accurately reflects civilian opportunity costs, the tax of
military service becomes negative.
The Economics of Voluntarism
From an economic perspective, "voluntarism" implies that each
man or woman who chooses to join the military bears no implicit
tax; i.e. receives a military wage which, at the very least, is
equal to his or her opportunity cost in the civilian sector at the
time of enlistment. If the distaste for military service is very
high,

then so is one's reservation wage.

As the enlistment

proceeds, it is conceivable a particular occupation might become
onerous, raising the reservation wage above the military wage.
However, well-laid career and promotional tracks plus shorter
enlistment periods minimize this potential cost.

If the military

wage rises (ceteris paribus) more individuals will volunteer their
labor services as their reservation wage is met.

As the military

wage structure is uniform and set by law, anyone who selects to
enlist has perfect information about the starting wage and earns an
economic rent.
Removal of the draft (and the costs of coercion) occasioned an
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increase in individual

(and social)

benefits accruing to the

On the other hand,

military experience.

since 1973,

traffic

through the military has been reduced as the composition of the
military becomes more careerist and less citizen-soldier in nature.
Accordingly, the military experience is spread over a smaller
segment of society, reducing the social benefits of a broader
military experience.

In the absense of conscription, the costs of

individual service have been lowered as have the benefits of a
broader participation.

The post-Cold War downsizing of the

military will further reduce the element of military experience in
us society.

The paper proposes

that a broader,

short term

exposure to military training would be a Pareto superior move for
society.
Benefits Accruing to a Broader Military Experience
The paper proposes that society benefits in two ways from a
more diffused military experience.

First,

service personnel

undertake both general and military-specific training which build
human capital and improve post-service productivity.

Second,

society benefits directly as military service becomes common to a
greater percentage of its population.

Social cohesiveness is

enhanced as more citizens of diverse social groups share a common
denominator of military training.

Military training spread over a

greater portion of society results in a greater proliferation of
socially desireable attributes such as discipline, responsibility,
and adaptability.
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In order to affect a wider dispersion of service-attendant
social benefits, the paper proposes a mechanism by which greater
numbers of the post-high school youthful cohort

(18-20) can

undertake military training for a brief, twelve month period and
then phase back into civilian life.

Military service during this

period might be optimal for those without established career goals
or distaste for military service.

Certainly, opportunity costs

during the immediate post-high school period would be minimized.
Therefore, the focus of the paper is to: (1) consider evidence
of the distinctive human and social capital generated by the
military experience; (2) propose how production of this service
specific capital can be encouraged through shorter periods of
enlistment and a more widespread military experience; and,

(3)

examine a reward structure for the new voluntary military training
program.

It is further suggested that this new infusion of short

term active duty military personnel will be cost-efficient and not
detrimental to the military mission.

Finally, through careful

structuring of the post-service benefits package, human and social
capital can be further stimulated through subsidized post-military
training and education.
HUman and Social Capital Generation in the Military
The distinction between human and social capital development
is a tenuous one, but one that must be attempted for the sake of
greater

clarity.

The

author

proposes

that

human

capital
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development,

in making the recruit more productive,

directly

rewards the acquirer with higher income, and indirectly benefits
the greater society; e.g. more productive labor resources may lower
costs, increase innovation, and raise incomes.

Social capital

generation refers to characteristics inculcated, fostered, and
honed by the military experience that result in social benefits of
an approximately equal incremental nature for all citizens; e. g. a
more tolerant, civic-minded, and law abiding society as the result
of a broader military experience.

It is further proposed that both

human and social capital are a joint product of the military
experience.
Changes in Technological Content of Military Skills and systems:
The military service of the 1990s is substantially different
than the military of the 1980s and of the 1970s from a perspective
of technological content.

Since the end of the Korean War, the

percentage of military manpower trained in traditional infantryman
skills has declined in favor of technology-oriented skills.

In

1945, white collar labor made up 28% of the military work force
compared to 47% .j..n 1985 (Binkin, 1986).

Calculated on a percentage

of total cost biasis, the electronic content of weapons systems
increased from 10 to 20 percent in the 1950's, to 20 to 30 percent
by the early l970's, to 40% by 1983 (Binkin, 1986).
6%

of

armed

f'orces

electronic technicians.

enlisted

personnel

were

In 1945, only

categorized

as

By 1985, this percentage had increased to

21% of military enlisted personnel (Binkin, 1986, p. 7-8). This
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technological

transformation

of

the

military,

plus

the

civilianization of some of the more mundane jobs (food service)
insures that even the least educated recruits will enjoy some real
level of human capital enhancement.
Magnum and Ball

(1989) focused on the tranferability of

military training to civilian occupations in veterans of the post
draft period.

They found a transferablity rate (45%-50%) for

military acquired skills to civilian employment, a higher rate than
previously hypothesized.

It is probable that the higher rate is

attributable for improved individual choice in both enlistment and
military career field decisions.

Furthermore,

the 50% skill

transferability rate was equal to that achieved in civilian
occupational training.
It is possible and indeed probable that military experience
allows the relative poor and unskilled a level of general training
that could not be realized

in civilian entry level positions,

training which would could not be undertaken at the individual's
own expense.

It should be noted that military downsizing and

reduced opportunity costs in the civilian sector have allowed the
military to tighten enlistment standards and thereby raise, rather
than lower, the ladder of social mobility for the least endowed.
However,

lower civilian wage expectations have made military

service a viable alternative for the better endowed youthful
cohort, particularly among minorities and females.
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The "Bridging" Effect and Military Service
Martindale and Poston (1979} consider the "bridging" effect
that military service has in channeling youth, and, in particular,
minorities into the socioeconomic mainstream, and the subsequent
positive impact on post-service income.

In examining the earnings

of World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam veterans relative to their
nonveteran cohorts, the authors find a positive correlation between
civilian earnings and prior military experience.

Furthermore, the

weight of the evidence is particularly strong for minorities
(African-Americans and Mexican-Americans),
military

serves

as

an

effective

suggesting that the

instrument

of

socioeconomic

mobility.
Little

and

Fredland

conclusions from a

(1979)

reach

different database.

essentially

the

same

Employing disaggregated

data from the National Longitudinal Survey on the 1966 earnings of
men aged 45 to 66, they find that military service has a positive
influence on civilian earnings fifteen to twenty years after
discharge.

Specifically,

white

veterans,

averaged

across

characteristic groups, earned incomes 5%-10% greater than their
nonveteran

cohort, while non-white (Hispanic) and black veterans

earned 13% -15% more than their nonveteran counterparts.

For

whites, this increment is equivalent to the return on a year's
additional education or four to seven added years of job tenure.
For African-Americans, the service-determined increase is worth two
to three years added schooling or seven extra years of job tenure.
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Furthermore, the study shows that white veterans averaged one more
year of post-military training than their nonveteran counterpart,
while minority veterans averaged two and one-half more years of
formal education than their nonveteran counterpart (Little and
Fredland, 1979).
There is a strong correlation between the existence of GI
Educational Bill rights and the attainment of additional education.
In turn, incremental training is positively correlated with income.
The evidence presented by Little and Fredland (1979) suggests that
military service may have a positive effect on life cycle income.
Thus, the "tax" of a functioning draft, may have been overstated.
Furthermore, the nature and extent of Vietnam GI Bill benefits may
help explain the post-service earnings gap of Vietnam veterans
relative to their Korean and Second World War counterparts. As
benefits under the Vietnam GI Bill of Rights were less extensive
than their predecessors,

Vietnam

veterans were

less apt to

undertake post-service training or enrolled for a shorter period.
Consequently, Vietnam veterans earned smaller returns on a smaller
investment.
The Veteran's Premium
Many of the studies which considered the burden and benefits
of military service were conducted in the 1970s, the general period
of conversion from a draft-augmented force to the all volunteer
system.

Because of the time frame,

the research tended to
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concentrate on the perceived short run net costs accruing to
military service.

Later, Angrist (1990) focuses on the veteran

within a ten year aftermath of discharge.

The common thread

linking most of the analyses conducted under the Gates commission
was that the draft imposed real costs on draftees and coerced
enlistees that were not offset by benefits.

The Gates Commission

was, in fact, an economic study of the feasibility of an all
volunteer force to replace a draft-augmented one. The Commission
considered objections to the AVS, including its potential lack of
representativeness and negative effect on the social fabric.
However,

it concluded that the tax of the draft was a

most

inefficient one and that the country would be better served by a
volunteer service, manned through the workings of a free labor
marketplace (Segal, 1989).

Furthermore,

the Commission took a

decidedly short run focus in its cost benefit analysis which tended
to bias its findings in favor of the AVS.
A countervailing body of research suggests a secular and
positive divergence between veteran and non-veteran earnings paths.
In the shorter run, the differential may be positive or negative
depending on the time frame over which veterans' earnings are
considered.

One possible explanation of the variation in findings

between short run (lower incomes for Vietnam era veterans) and long
run

(higher incomes for veterans in general) is that Vietnam

veterans may have entered a decidedly different labor market than
their World War II counterparts.
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Magnum and Ball (1989) combed the National Longitudinal Survey
data for evidence on the civilian sector earnings of post-draft era
They found, as did studies of World War II and Korean

veterans.

War veterans, that an earnings premium for veterans did in fact
exist,

and surfaced within two years after entering civilian

employment.

Their findings add credence to the view of the

Vietnam experience as an outlier - one inconsistent with the
history of the military as a documented generator of human capital.
Also, as many of the studies of Vietnam veterans consider
post-service earnings

in

the

relatively short

post-discharge

period, the premium attributable to veteran status may not yet have
revealed itself, particularly in the case of initial entry into an
adverse labor market (DeTray, 1982; Little and Fredland, 1979).
Were the premium lagged until the veteran's early middle age before
exerting itself, lifetime earnings, even when discounted, outweigh
any short-run costs. The author concurs with Schwartz (1986) in
viewing

any

negative

impact

on

post-service

"particular feature of the Vietnam war. "

earnings

as

a

It follows that, in the

absense of a Vietnam conflict, the draft, and coerced military
service and in the presence of higher military pay scales and a
technologically

intensified

armed

services,

any

cost-benefit

analysis of the military experience will swing toward the (more)
positive.
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The question for economists becomes, why does the premium
occur?

The literature generally attributes the post-service wage

premium to two sources: (1) differences in human capital investment
by veterans and non-veterans; and, (2) employers• use of veteran
status as a screening device (De Tray, 1982).
Human capital and Credentialism
To test the hypothesis that the effect of military service on
civilian wages is positively related to the veteran component of
any group, DeTray (1982) draws data from the 1960 and 1970 Census
Public Use Samples.

The resulting evidence seems to �orroborate

his hypothesis of a positive correlation between veteran status and
private sector wage.

While some of the wage differential is

attributable to general human capital acquired from military
specific training, and subsequent, government-financed training
post-military service, Detray

assigns a significant part of the

difference to the reality that employers use veteran status as a
credential - an effective means of screening job q.pplicants.
Veteran status provides a vacancy filling firm with tnformation
that the applicant has been pre-screened by the military. That is,
the veteran has passed sufficient tests to be accepted by the
military, designated as qualified, and honorably disc4arged from
the performance of his or her duties.
signal

employers

that

the

Veteran status, then, may

applicant has a

proven

level

of

productivity, while the non-veteran lacks that credentia:1; enabling
a higher wage for the veteran (Little and Fredland, 1979).
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Unique Social Capital
The concept of a purely social capital, uniquely generated by
a broader exposure to military training, constitutes an intangible
which evades attempts at quantification.

Nonetheless, there is

support that such capital does exist and is produced through
military service.

A broader military experience is seen by Charles

Moskos (1982) and Moskos and Faris (1982) as consistent with
increased participation of society in the requirements of democracy
and the creation of a common denominator of shared experience for
a greater cross-section of society.

A greater diffusion of

military service is also viewed as increasing the production of the
characteristics of discipline, responsibility, and social order which would tend to strengthen the cohesiveness of a society.

A

military that is more representative of the greater society, in
that a larger segment of the civilian population has undergone
military training, would tend to be less alienated from that
society.

Inversely, a broader military experience would result in

a military that is more reflective of widely held social values.
Finally, a larger "pass-through" military service by the larger
society would create a greater awareness of military efficiency and
help to establish real constraints against redundant programs and
personnel.

In Democracy in America, Tocqueville (1877) describes

the benefits, for the military and the greater society, of the
citiz�n soldier:
Among democratic nations the private soldiers remain most like
�:ivilians; upon them the habits of the nation have the firmest
hold, and public opinion the most influence. It is by the
instrumentality of the private soldier especially that it may
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be possible to infuse into a democratic army the love of
freedom and the respect of rights, if these principles have
once been inculcated on the people at large. The reverse
happens among aristocratic nations, where the soldiery have
eventually nothing in common with their fellow-citizens and
where they live among them as strangers, and often as enemies.
New Military Enlistment option

It is proposed that a new enlistment option be extended to

young men and women, 18-20 years old.

The year or two following

high school is viewed as the transition period between youth and
adulthood and a time for reassessment.

Accordingly, it is in this

period where the opportunity costs of military service are lower
than at any other stage of the life cycle.

The new enlistment

option entails an active duty commitment of twelve months, with
additional active or reserve service at the option of the recruit
and the respective services.
It is expected that the nature of military training will be a
mix of general (the first six months) and civilian occupation
specific (the last six months). Knapp (1973) suggests that aspects
of general training such as "discipline, ability to get along with
others, and good citizenship, " are as positively correlated with
higher civilian earnings as is occupation-specific training.
Knapp proceeds to note that the "burden" of military service.
becomes more negative (less than zero dollars) when the military
training is undertaken at lower ages, levels of education,
and periods of enlistment.
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In 1990,
services

the first term enlistment accessions of the four

totaled

217, 000

personnel.

It

is

proposed

that,

initially, the new option add 100, 000 recruits to the milltary
services; incrementing each service in proportion to the 1990 first
term enlistments of each branch as a percentage of total accessions
(Army 39%, Navy 29%, Air Force 17%, Marine Corps 15%) •

The

increase of new accessions by 50% should not affect service mission
capability nor strain existing facilities.

New accessions as a

percentage of total force strength would increase modestly, from
10. 6 % to 15. 5%.

It is further proposed that the 100, 000 force

increment be raised gradually to a ceiling of 200,000 (US Bureau of
the Census, 1992).
As

an

integral

part

of

the

new

enlistment

option,

participants, upon successful completion of duty tours, will be
guaranteed a low interest student loan to continue their tr�ining
or education. Initially, the maximum loan to each student would be
limited to $10, 000.

This ceiling would be adjusted upward by the

average annual increase in higher education costs.
Implementation of such an option will benefit society and the
military in three ways.

First,

it will spread the military

experience over a greater cross-section of society, increasing the
representativeness of the

military and expanding the common

denominator of military service, thereby strengthening the social
fabric.

Second, the new enlistment option, through active duty and
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post-military training and education will act to enhance the human
capital stock of the youthful (18-20) cohort and allow a secular
flow of return on investment.

Finally, such a program will act to

augment the reserves at a critical juncture in time.

Under the

Total Force policy, reservists have a greatly expanded role in
maintaining the nation I s security (Binkin and Kaufman,

1989).

Reservists are now a major part of any initial deployment of combat
troops.

The role of the reserves will increase rather than shrink

as the active military services are downsized as part of the post
Cold War, deficit reduction package.
Summary
Military service is a proven developer of human and social
capital.

The thrust of the literature is that World War II and

Korean veterans enjoy a civilian earnings premium associated with
military service.

There is no evidence yet of a positive income

differential attributable to Vietnam-era duty. Indeed, much of the
literature associates a negative post-service earnings differential
with Vietnam-era service. The Vietnam era period may be considered
an outlier, in terms of unique economic conditions, characteristics
of Vietnam-era veterans, lower levels of post-service educational
benefits and possible discrimination against veterans by employers.
More recently in the post-draft period, (Magnum and Ball, 1989)
when the AVS is sampled, the earnings premium turns positive again.
In 1993, President Clinton's National Service proposal was
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enacted with the expressed purpose of creating civic awareness and
instilling a sense of social responsibility in young people.

The

author contends that we have a viable means of gaining such ends in
place - the US Armed Forces.

A brief period of enlistment, spread

across a greater cross section of the youthful cohort, could
achieve many of the same goals targeted by National Service in a
more cost efficient manner.
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